Brand new Airsoft AEG on the market - Licensed DPMS Panther Arms M4 Carbine Pro Player Series. This is another remarkable airsoft gun from Cybergun. Some of the awesome features include Metal Gear Box, Enhanced Hop Up System and 300 round magazine.
Special Features:
METAL GEAR BOX
Electric Power Full Auto System
300 ROUND MAGAZINE.
ENHANCED HOP UP SYSTEM
Specifications:
Length: 29.8 inches.
Weight: 5.9 lbs (Including Battery)
Barrel: 14.5 in.
Magazine Capacity: 300 rounds
Ammunition: .20g 6mm BBs
Feet Per Second: 350 fps
Full Auto Rate of Fire: 500 - 1000 rounds per min.
Not intended for paintball use.
Operation Manual and Warranty Registration are Included with Item.
The Colt National Match Airsoft gun is spring operated and utilizes BAXS accuracy system. The Pistol is Heavy Weight Series, Black with black grips and includes 1 bag of .20 gram BBs.
Part of the Colt Classic Performance Series, our Double Eagle Clear Pistol contains BAXS Spring - the ultimate accuracy system. Fully licensed with serial numbers and safety switch. This airsoft spring pistol comes complete with 1 space magazine and net target. Features & Specifications: Velocity: 315 FPS New BAXS accuracy system Magazine Capacity: 12 Rounds Range: 44 Yards Weight: 1 lb Length: 8.75 inches
Price: 29.99
M4 Field Duty Kit - Colt MK IV Softair Airsoft Spring Pistol & DPMS Panther Arms A17 R.I.S. Softair Airsoft Electric Rifle (semi & full automatic) This package includes two of the hottest airsoft guns on the market. You get the licensed Colt MK IV spring pistol and licensed DPMS Panther Arms A17 R.I.S. AEG. Both officially licensed from Cybergun. The A17 AEG features a red dot sight, mounting rails, adjustable sight, flashlight, vertical grip, rechargeable battery and is both semi and full automatic. The MK IV Spring pistol features a mounting rail and flash light. Specifications (MK IV): Velocity 205 FPS Energy 0.24 Joule Mag Capacity 14 BBs Power Range: 66 ft. Accuracy: Can hit a quarter from 18 ft. Shooting System: Spring Powered Specifications (A17 R.I.S): Velocity 302 FPS Energy 0.5 Joule Mag Capacity 300 BBs Power Range: 117 ft. Accuracy: Can hit a quarter from 18 ft. Power: AEG Powered Shooting System: SPIN UP Accuracy: Can hit a quarter from 25 ft.
Price: 99.99
This airsoft rifle is great for the beginner. Very close in form and function to the real steel M-16A2, this inexpensive airsoft rifle will provide hours of enjoyment. With this M-16A2 replica, the admiration continues in the sports realm of AirSoft. Comes complete with 1000 .12g bbs, safety goggles and rifle strap. SPECIFICATIONS:
This is a wonderful model of a traditional Japanese Jin Tachi sword. It's as collectible as it is functional for Martial Arts practice.
The model features and extra long (14") curved down handle adding to it's unique appearance. Aluminum scabbard is finished in a shiny black lacquer with designs painted in gold. All hardware is polished gold.
A 440 Stainless steel Samurai blade has the classic curved profile and is sharpened.
These are beautiful swords and are well made. Each sword has a hardwood polished black finished scabbard. The end caps and hilt are dark molds with a decorated design. The black cord wrappings nicely match the scabbard colors.
The blades are high quality stainless steel and false edged.
The sword lengths are 21-3/4 inch 31 inch and 39-3/4 inch.
The base of the stand is 13 inches wide and 14 inches high and is constructed of solid wood with a black painted finish.
This is the perfect addition to any collection! Made of high quality Stainless Steel this double blade samurai sword is the stuff of legends. Two twin blades side by side measure 26" each and create an amazing fantsy world for the holder. This sword is perfect for Cosplay (a Japanese subculture centered on dressing as characters from manga anime tokusatsu and video games)!
26" blade double blades
41 1/2" overall
Blades made of 440 stainless steel
Tsuka (handle): Hardwood
Tsuba (hand gaurd): Zinc Alloy
Saya (scabbard): Flat Black Hardwood Speckled With Black Lacquer
This beautiful BLACK CORD RAPPED NINJA SWORD is well crafted with a black steel hilt and handle. It has a total length of approximately 37 inches. The blade itself is sharpened and has a black finish.
This item can be displayed on an office wall or used as a house wall decoration and can be used in stage plays as a prop.
This blade comes with a black finished aluminum scabbard and is ready to wear.
Price: 25.29
This beautiful FULL BLACK OVER RED CORD WRAPPED NINJA SWORD is well made with decorative BRASS hilt with decorative cut outs.
This sword has great balance and can be used in exhibitions.
This item can also be displayed on an office wall or used as a house wall decoration and also can be used in stage plays as a prop.
This blade is comes with a BLACK OVER RED cord wrapped design scabbard matching the handle and is ready to wear.
: Overall Length: 36" Blade Length: 25-7/16" Blade Thickness: 5/32" Blade Material: 420 J2 stainless steel double edged with cut-outs fully functional. Handle Material: Black over red cord wrapped over steel with Brass Hilt & Pommel Scabbard: Black over red cord wrapped over wood. List - $49.99
These are beautiful swords and are well made. Each sword has a black and blue webbed wraped scabbard and includes shoulder/belt straps. Also includes black 3 piece katana stand.
Large Sword Measures 35-1/2" overall with 27" Blade Length
Medium Sword Measures 24" overall with 16-3/4" Blade Length
Small Sword Measures 18-1/2" overall with 12" Blade Length
These are beautiful swords and are well made. Each sword has a black and green webbed wraped scabbard and includes shoulder/belt straps. Also includes black 3 piece katana stand.
War is the reciprocal and violent application
of force between hostile political entities aimed at
bringing about a desired political end-state via armed
conflict. In his seminal work,
On War,
Carl Von Clausewitz calls war the "continuation of
political intercourse, carried on with other means."[1]
War is an interaction in which two or more militaries
have a “struggle of wills”.[2]
When qualified as a
civil war, it is a dispute inherent to a given
society, and its nature is in the conflict over modes of
governance rather than
sovereignty. War is not considered to be the same as
mere
occupation,
murder or
genocide because of the reciprocal nature of the
violent struggle, and the
organized nature of the units involved.
War is also a cultural entity, and its practice is
not linked to any single type of political organisation
or society. Rather, as discussed by
John Keegan in his “History Of Warfare”, war is a
universal phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by
the society that wages it.
[3]
The conduct of war extends along a continuum, from the
almost universal
tribal warfare that began well before recorded human
history, to wars between
city states,
nations, or
empires. A group of combatants and their support is
called an
army on land, a
navy at sea, and
air force in the air. Wars may be prosecuted
simultaneously in one or more different
theatres. Within each theatre, there may be one or
more consecutive
military campaigns. A military campaign includes not
only fighting but also intelligence, troop movements,
supplies,
propaganda, and other components. Continuous
conflict is traditionally called a
battle, although this terminology is not always fed
to conflicts involving aircraft, missiles or bombs
alone, in the absence of ground troops or naval forces.
War is not limited to the
human species, as
ants engage in massive intra-species conflicts which
might be termed warfare. It is theorized that other
species also engage in similar behavior, although this
is not well documented.
[4][5][6]
Some believe war has always been with us; others
stress the lack of clear evidence that war is not in our
prehistoric past, and the fact that many peaceful,
non-military societies have and still do exist.
Originally, war likely consisted of small-scale raiding.
Since the rise of the state some 5000 years ago,
military activity has occurred over much of the globe.
The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of
technological advances led to modern warfare.
Since the close of the
Vietnam War, the ideas expounded by the Prussian
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) have
come to thoroughly permeate American military writing,
doctrinal, theoretical, and historical. His book
On War, first published (as
Vom Kriege) in 1832, was adopted as a key
text at the Naval War College in 1976, the Air War
College in 1978, the Army War College in 1981. It has
always been central at the U.S. Army's School for
Advanced Military Studies at Leavenworth (founded in
1983). The U.S. Marine Corps's brilliant little
philosophical field manual
FMFM 1: Warfighting (1989) is essentially a
distillation of On War, and the newer Marine
Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs,
c.1997) are equally reflective of Clausewitz's basic
concepts.*1
This is not the first time Clausewitz has been in
fashion. Indeed, On War has been the bible of
many thoughtful soldiers ever since Field Marshal
Helmuth von Moltke attributed to its guidance his
stunning victories in the wars of German unification
(1864, 1866, 1870-71). Nor is it the first time that
individual American soldiers and military
thinkers have been attracted by his ideas: George
Patton, Albert Wedemeyer, and—especially—Dwight
Eisenhower were intensely interested in what he had to
say.
It is, however, the first time that the American
armed forces as institutions have turned to
Clausewitz. While the philosopher had insisted that war
was "simply the expression of politics by other means,"
the traditional attitude of American soldiers had been
that "politics and strategy are radically and
fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where
politics end. All that soldiers ask is that once the
policy is settled, strategy and command shall be
regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics."*2
The sudden acceptability of Clausewitz in the wake of
Vietnam is not difficult to account for, for among the
major military theorists only Clausewitz seriously
struggled with the sort of dilemma that American
military leaders faced in the aftermath of their defeat.
Clearly, in what had come to be called in scathing terms
a "political war," the political and military components
of the American war effort had come unstuck. It ran
against the grain of America's military men to criticize
elected civilian leaders, but it was just as difficult
to take the blame upon themselves. Clausewitz's analysis
could not have been more relevant:
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for
war,... the more closely will the military aims and
the political objects of war coincide, and the more
military and less political will war appear to be.
On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the
less will the military element's natural tendency to
violence coincide with political directives. As a
result, war will be driven further from its natural
course, the political object will be more and more
at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the
conflict will seem increasingly political in
character.*3
When people talk, as they often do, about
harmful political influence on the management of
war, they are not really saying what they mean.
Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not
with its influence.
Vom Kriege (IPA: [fɔm
ˈkʁiːgə]) is a book on
war and
military strategy by
Prussian general
Carl von Clausewitz, written mostly after the
Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and
published posthumously by his wife in 1832. It has been
translated into
English several times as On War. On
War is actually an unfinished work; Clausewitz had
set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827,
but did not live to finish the task. His wife eventually
compiled all the work and the final two chapters
Clausewitz never finished.
On War is one of the first books on modern
military strategy. This is mainly due to Clausewitz'
integration of politics and social and economic issues
as some of the most important factors in deciding the
outcomes of a war. It is one of the most important
treatises on strategy ever written, and is prescribed at
various
military academies to this day.
Carl von Clausewitz was a
Prussian officer among those baffled by how the
armies of the
French Revolution and
Napoleon had changed the nature of war through their
ability to motivate the populace and thus unleash war on
a greater scale than had previously been the case in
Europe. Clausewitz was well educated and had a strong
interest in art, science, and education, but he was a
professional soldier who spent a considerable part of
his life fighting against Napoleon. There is no doubt
that the insights he gained from his experiences,
combined with a solid grasp of European history,
provided much of the raw material for the book. On
War represents the compilation of his most cogent
observations.
Note: Clausewitz states that Napoleon's tactics were
not revolutionary at all and that Napoleonic Warfare did
not change anything greatly in military history. The
technology of weaponry for the most part remained
static, and new strategies weren't developed, but rather
Napoleon refurbished old ones, mixing them into one
grand strategy.
The book contains a wealth of historical examples
used to illustrate its various concepts.
Frederick II of Prussia (the Great) figures
prominently for having made very efficient use of the
limited forces at his disposal.
Napoleon also is a central figure.
Among many strands of thought, three stand out as
essential to Clausewitz' concept:
War must never be seen as a purpose to itself,
but as a means of physically forcing one's will on
an opponent ("War is not merely a political act, but
also a real political instrument, a continuation of
political commerce, a carrying out of the same by
other means."[1]).
The military objectives in war that support
one's political objectives fall into two broad
types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to
"disarm” the enemy: “to render [him] politically
helpless or militarily impotent."
The course of war will tend to favor the party
employing more force and resources (a notion
extended by Germany's leaders in World War One into
"total war"—the pursuit of complete military victory
regardless of the political consequences).
Military strategy is a
national defence policy implemented by
military organisations to pursue desired
strategic goals.[1]
Derived from the
Greek
strategos, strategy when it appeared in use
during the 18th century[2],
was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the
general"[3],
'the art of arrangement' of troops.[4]
Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of
campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and
the
deception of the
enemy. The father of modern strategic study,
Carl von Clausewitz, defined military strategy as
"the employment of battles to gain the end of war."
Liddell Hart's definition put less emphasis on
battles, defining strategy as "the art of distributing
and applying military means to fulfil the ends of
policy" Hence, both gave the pre-eminence to political
aims over military goals, ensuring
civilian control of the military.
"You must not fight too often with one enemy,
or you will teach him all your art of war." –
Napoleon Bonaparte
Military strategy is the plan and execution of
the contest between very large groups of armed
adversaries. It involves each opponent's diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic resources wielded
against the other's resources to gain supremacy or
reduce the opponent's will to fight. It is a principle
tool to secure the
national interest. A contemporary military strategy
is developed via
military science.
[5]
It is as old as
society itself. It is a subdiscipline of
warfare and of
foreign policy. In comparison,
grand strategy is that strategy of the largest of
organizations which are currently the
nation state,
confederation, or international
alliances. Military strategy has its origins before
the
Battle of the Ten Kings and will endure through the
space age. It is larger in perspective than
military tactics which is the disposition and
maneuver of units on a particular sea or battlefield.[6]
Military strategy in the 19th century was still
viewed as one of a trivium of "arts" or "sciences" that
govern the conduct of warfare; the others being
tactics, the execution of plans and manœuvering of
forces in battle, and
logistics, the maintenance of an army. The view had
prevailed since the Roman times, and the borderline
between strategy and tactics at this time was blurred,
and sometimes categorization of a decision is a matter
of almost personal opinion.
Carnot, during the
French Revolutionary Wars thought it simply involved
concentration of troops.[7]
The Battle of Siffin, illustration from a
19th century manuscript by
Muhammad Rafi Bazil.
Strategy and
tactics are closely related and exist on the same
continuum.
